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Abstract—Biometrics security is a dynamic research area
spurred by the need to protect personal traits from threats like
theft, non-authorised distribution, reuse and so on. A widely
investigated solution to such threats consists in processing the
biometric signals under encryption, to avoid any leakage of
information towards non-authorised parties. In this paper, we
propose to leverage on the superior performance of multimodal
biometric recognition to improve the efficiency of a biometric-
based authentication protocol operating on encrypted data under
the malicious security model. In the proposed protocol, authen-
tication relies on both facial and iris biometrics, whose repre-
sentation accuracy is specifically tailored to trade-off between
recognition accuracy and efficiency. From a cryptographic point
of view, the protocol relies on SPDZ [1], [2]. Experimental results
show that the multimodal protocol is faster than corresponding
unimodal protocols achieving the same accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the digital and increasingly interconnected world we live
in, establishing individuals’ identity is a pressing need. For this
reason, in the last decades, we have seen an increasing interest
in biometric-based recognition systems. Biometric recognition
can be split into two main categories: authentication and iden-
tification. In the first scenario, also referred to as verification,
the user is interested in demonstrating that he/she is who
he/she claims to be, while in the second one, the goal is to
determine the identity of the user submitting the biometric
template among those known by the system. Usually, in both
verification and identification protocols, a single biometric trait
is used to extract a feature vector. The feature vector then
is matched with one or more templates stored in the system
database. In this work we focus on an authentication protocol.
More recently, the security of biometric systems has
become a very active research area, due to the necessity
of impeding newly emerging cybercrimes like identity theft,
privacy violation, unauthorized access to sensitive information
and so on [3]. Protocols allowing to process encrypted bio-
metric signals without decrypting them are among the most
widely studied solutions to enhance the security of biometric
systems [4], [5]. According to such an approach, verification
or identification is carried out by the system by relying only
on encrypted biometric templates, thus avoiding the risk that
sensitive information is leaked during the protocol.
The possibility of processing a comparing encrypted bio-
metric templates relies on a number of cryptographic tools
[6], [7], [8], [9], broadly referred to as Multi-Party Compu-
tation (MPC) [10]. Generally speaking, MPC protocols can
be classified according to the adopted security model. The
most common distinction considers protocols which are secure
only against semi-honest adversaries, and those which can be
proven to be secure also against malicious adversaries. To be
specific, according to the semi-honest model, all the parties
execute the protocol without deviating from it, but meanwhile
they try to obtain as much information as possible about the
other parties’ data. Protocols developed in the semi-honest
model are very efficient and, for this reason, are adopted in
the majority of the works proposed so far [4], [5]. On the
contrary, in the malicious model, the parties can arbitrarily
deviate from the protocol in their attempt to get access to
sensitive information. While security against malicious parties
is desirable, in many real world applications, the resulting
protocols have a very high complexity and their use in real
systems is often impractical. The great majority of the attempts
made so far to devise efficient biometric recognition protocols
in the malicious setting, focused on the development and use
of innovative and efficient MPC and cryptographic primitives.
A much less investigated approach consists in the adoption of
biometric recognition protocols which are better suited to be
implemented in a MPC framework. Yet, as highlighted in [5],
working on the signal processing side of the problem may help
to reduce significantly the complexity of the resulting MPC
protocol, e.g. by efficiently trading off between accuracy and
complexity.
A. Contribution
In this work, we follow the above strategy and present
SEMBA: a SEcure Multi-Biometric Authentication protocol
which achieves a better trade-off between efficiency and accu-
racy with respect to the single modality subsystems composing
it. This represents a major departure from most works on
multimodal biometric systems, in which the availability of
multiple biometric modalities is exploited to decrease in-
terclass variability and improve intra-class similarity in the
presence of acquisition noise and any other kind of distortion
[11]. In this framework, the main contributions of the paper
are the following: i) we design a multimodal biometric sys-
tem that combines face and iris templates and that can be
easily implemented by relying on Secure Multiparty Compu-
tation protocols; ii) we propose a privacy preserving multi-
biometric authentication protocol secure against a malicious
party. SEMBA is based on the SPDZ tool [1], [2] and
discloses only the final binary decision; iii) we compare
our multi-biometric protocol with single biometric protocols,
showing that by using a properly simplified representation of
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the two biometric traits, backed by a rigorous signal processing
analysis, the multimodal protocol can reach the same accuracy
of the corresponding single-modality systems based on more
accurate - and more complicated - representations of iris
and face templates, but with significantly lower computational
complexity. In particular, SEMBA obtains the same accuracy
of the stand alone iris authentication protocol described in [12].
Of course, system designers could also decide to exploit the
superior performance allowed by multimodal authentication to
improve authentication accuracy with the same complexity of
the single modality protocols.
II. PRIOR WORKS
In the last years, many cryptographic tools, including
oblivious transfer [6], homomorphic encryption [8], [13], and
garbled circuits [7], have been used for privacy protection of
biometrics templates. In most works, such tools are used in
such a way to achieve security in the semi-honest model.
Many privacy preserving authentication protocols have been
proposed in the literature making use of a wide variety of
biometric traits. Since, in this work, we present a privacy
preserving multibiometric authentication protocol based on
face and iris, we focus on the state of art relative to those
biometries, then we discuss the few works achieving privacy
protection in the malicious model and finally we discuss
the main characteristics of multimodal (or fusion) biometric
systems.
A. Biometric recognition in the semi-honest model
As pointed in [4], [5], many prior works on biometric
recognition are designed to be secure against semi-honest
adversaries. Some examples are [14], [15] for face recognition
and [16], [17], [18] for iris recognition. In order to guarantee
security, the above papers are based on many cryptographic
techniques such as Pailler additive homomorphic cryptosystem
(HE), Oblivious Transfer (OT) or Garbled Circuit (GC). For
efficiency reasons, such protocol are mainly based on the
eigenface [19] and iriscode [20] representation of iris and face
respectively. More accurate protocols exist, but their privacy
preserving implementation has such a high complexity to make
them impractical.
B. Biometric recognition in malicious setting
There are few works on privacy preserving biometric
authentication secure under a malicious model. Kantarcioglu
and Kardes [21] present a way to implement some prim-
itives, specifically the dot product and equality check, in
the malicious model, by also analyzing the corresponding
computational cost. Even if this work is not directly related
to biometrics, the proposed solutions can be adapted to them.
In [22], Abidin presents a general framework for biometric
authentication that uses a homomorphic encryption scheme
to evaluate the distance between two encrypted biometric
templates. In his work, Abidin proves security against ma-
licious attacks, but does not provide results about the practical
implementation of the protocol. In [23], Pathak and Raj present
two speech-based authentication protocols. The first one is
an interactive protocol based on Pailler cryptosystem which
is secure against a semi-honest adversary, the second one is
a non-interactive protocol based on BNG [24] cryptosystem,
which allows to perform an arbitrary number of additions and
one multiplication between ciphertexts, and is secure against
malicious attacks. In both cases the output is a probability
value and the client checks if such a value is equal to zero
or not in the plain domain. From the tests and the analysis
reported in [23] it is clear that the interactive protocol is more
efficient than the malicious one.
A large number of approaches [25], [26], [27], [28], [29]
have been proposed to make Yao’s garbled circuit techniques
secure in the malicious model through Zero Knowledge proof,
cut and choose, or other techniques. Such approaches can
also be used for biometric authentication protocols, but their
complexity is so high to make them impractical. Gasti et al.
[30] propose a lightweight biometric authentication protocol
based on simple garbled circuits and secure against malicious
adversaries by relying on an untrusted third party (the cloud).
The goal of the protocol is to minimize the amount of
computation performed by the biometric owner’s device (a
smartphone), while also reducing the protocol execution time
and without the necessity to rely on cut-and-choose techniques.
In the protocol, the biometric owner acts as circuit constructor,
the cloud as circuit evaluator, while the server verifies the
correctness of the circuit. The approach is secure against
colluding biometric owner and cloud, but not against colluding
server and cloud.
C. Multimodal biometric recognition
Given the recent technological advances, novel devices are
often equipped with numerous sensors, opening the way to
multi-biometric authentication. In [31] Ross, Nandakumar, and
Jain present an overview of the possible fusion scenarios and
their applications in real life. For our protocol we choose a
multimodal system, that combines information from face and
iris.
Biometric signals are usually processed in four stages. First
a sensor captures the traits of an individual as a raw biometric
data. Second, raw data are processed and a compact represen-
tation of the physical traits, called features, is extracted. Then
the feature template is matched with the templates stored in
a database. Finally the matching score is used to determine
an identity or to validate a claimed identity. Information can
be merged at any time during a multi-biometric recognition
protocol. For further information about this topic readers may
refer to [31]. The choice of fusion depends on the intended
application, its specific characteristics and the multiparty com-
putation tool chosen to guarantee privacy. Fusing the biometric
signals at an early stage results in a higher accuracy of the
protocol at the expenses of a higher complexity. For this
reason, the most used approach, and the one we use in this
paper, is score level fusion, whereby the match scores from
each biometric trait involved in the process are combined
to obtain the final result. Score level fusion combines good
accuracy and relatively easy implementation.
To the best of our knowledge, Gomez-Barrero et al. [32]
have proposed the only previous work on multibiometric
privacy protection operating in the encrypted domain. In their
work, the authors present a general framework for multi-
biometric template protection based on Pailler cryptosystem,
in which only encrypted data is handled. The authors examine
the outcome of the fusion of on-line signature and fingerprints,
at three different levels of fusion: feature, score and decision
levels. The system presented by Gomez et al. has a low
computational cost (only one decryption on the server side and
no encryptions at verification time), moreover they obtained a
good accuracy (EER = 0.12%), with a required time for a
single comparison of about 5 · 10−4s. A drawback with the
system described in [32], is that comparison is carried out
on plain data by the server, thus introducing a breach into
the security of the system. On the contrary, in our work we
implement also the final comparison step within the SPDZ
framework, to prevent any security loss, even if this choice
has a non-negligible cost in terms of complexity (see Section
VI). As a further difference, in [32] an Euclidean distance
computation (in case of two-modal system) requires M ·F +2
exponentiations, where M is the number of enrolled samples
and F the feature’s total number considering all the modalities.
In our work, instead, thanks to the SPDZ system and to the
possibility of using integer numbers, we need only k (the
length of the feature vector) squares, one of our most expensive
operations.
III. TOOLS
In this section, we present the cryptographic and biomet-
rical tools used in our protocol.
A. Cryptographic tools: SPDZ system
Damga˚rd et al. [1], [2] proposed the MPC framework
named SPDZ, a two - or multi-party - computation protocol
secure against an active adversary corrupting up to n − 1 of
the n players. This method uses multiplicative triples generated
offline by using Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE)
to efficiently perform online secret sharing operations.
We assume the computation is performed over a fixed finite
field Fp of characteristic p; where p is a prime number. Each
player Pi has an uniform share αi ∈ Fp of a secret key α
such that α =
∑n
i=1 αi mod p (in the following we omit
the indication of the modulus operation for simplicity). In this
paper we focus on secure two-party computation protocols,
then n = 2 and α = α1 + α2. An item a ∈ Fp is 〈·〉-
shared if the player Pi holds a tuple 〈ai, γ(a)i〉 such that
a = a1 + a2 and γ(a) = γ(a)1 + γ(a)2. In other words, ai
and γ(a)i are additive secret shares of a and γ(a). The value
γ(a) represents the Message Authentication Code (MAC) of
a. Any operation involving some variables is also performed
on their MAC, so that, at the end of the protocol, the MAC is
checked before revealing the outcome. If one of the parties has
a different MAC from the others, the procedure aborts. During
the description of the protocol, we say that a 〈·〉 - shared value
is partially opened if each party reveals to the other one the
value ai but not the associated γ(a)i.
An SPDZ protocol can be divided into two major phases.
The preprocessing phase, sometimes referred to as the offline
phase, where the system is set up, and the online phase, where
the actual computation is performed. In the offline phase,
parties generate a public key and a shared secret key for the
SHE scheme. Then, relying on the homomorphic properties
of the SHE, the pre-processing protocol generates α and α’s
shares, input shares, shares of tuples for multiplications and
TABLE I. LINEAR OPERATION IN SPDZ. WITH 〈a〉 WE INDICATE THE
PAIR 〈a, γ(a)〉, 〈a〉i INDICATES THE PAIR 〈ai, γ(a)i〉.
operation party 1 party 2
〈a〉+ 〈b〉 〈a〉1 + 〈b〉1 〈a〉2 + 〈b〉2
〈a〉 − 〈b〉 〈a〉1 − 〈b〉1 〈a〉2 − 〈b〉2
α · 〈a〉 α · 〈a〉1 α · 〈a〉2
c+ 〈a〉 c+ 〈a〉1 〈a〉2
squares, and the random share values necessary to evaluate
the comparison [2]. Finally each party decrypts his set of pre-
processed data by using his secret key share. In this paper,
we assume that the generation of tuples and inputs has been
already made in the encrypted domain before the protocol
starts and we focus our efforts on the analysis of the online
part of the system.
By using SPDZ, linear operations, such as additions and
scalar multiplications (see Table I), can be performed on
the 〈·〉-shares without interaction; while products between
ciphertexts and comparisons need data transmission and proper
sub-protocols. Products and square operations are evaluated
through interactive protocols that use multiplication triples
generated during the preprocessing phase. Due to lack of
space we refer to [1], [2] for implementation details. Each
multiplication requires two transmissions from each party
to the other, while each square operation requires only one
transmission.
1) Comparison: Here we show how to compute the out-
come of a secure comparison x < y, for any two elements
x, y ∈ Fp, according to the protocol proposed in [33], that
has the lowest computational complexity among all the secure
comparison protocols proposed so far.
The comparison computation is based on the observation
that 〈x < y〉 is determined by the truth values of 〈x < p2 〉,〈y < p2 〉, and 〈(x− y) mod p < p2 〉, where 〈x < y〉 indicates
the share values of the outcome of x < y. By choosing p
so large that both inputs are lower than p2 , it is sufficient to
evaluate only 〈(x− y) mod p < p2 〉.
Given z = x− y, then 〈x < y〉 can be easily computed as
1−〈z < p2 〉. We observe that if z > p2 then 2z > p. Since we
work on Fp, we have that 2z mod p = 2z − p and it is odd;
else if z < p2 than 2z < p and it will be even because we do
not need any modular operation. Therefore, to establish if z
is larger or smaller than p2 we need to determine only the last
significant bit of 2z. To compute the last significant bit of 2z,
we use a value 〈r〉 shared by parties both as integer and as
a bit array. The value r along with its bit decomposition are
pre-computed off line. We indicate as r0r1 . . . r` the bits of r
and with 〈ri〉 their shared values.
First of all we compute 〈s〉 = 〈2z + r〉, then s is partially
opened. If s < p then the last significant bit of 2z is equal to
s0 ⊕ r0, otherwise it is equal to 1− (s0 ⊕ r0).
Since we work in the field Fp, s < p iff s < r. By recalling
that s is known to both parties, we can easily obtain a 〈·〉-
share of δ, the truth value of 〈s < r〉 (i.e. 〈δ〉 = 〈s < r〉)
working on the bits of s and on the shared bits of r. Then
we use the following procedure to calculate 〈δ〉 = 〈s < r〉.
nosep,noitemsep
If s0 = 0 then 〈δ〉 = 〈r0〉 else 〈δ〉 = 〈0〉.
For all i < `− 1
if si = 0 then 〈δ〉 = 〈ri〉+ 〈δ〉 · 〈1− ri〉
else 〈δ〉 = 〈ri〉 · 〈δ〉.
Now 〈z < p2 〉 can be easily calculated as
〈δ ⊕ s0 ⊕ r0〉 = 〈δ〉 − 〈s0 ⊕ r0〉 − 〈δ〉 · 〈s0 ⊕ r0〉 (1)
Since s0 is known in our implementation,
〈δ ⊕ s0 ⊕ r0〉 =
{ 〈δ〉+ 〈r0〉 − 2 · 〈δ〉 · 〈r0〉 if s0 = 0,
1 + 2〈δ〉 · 〈r0〉 − 〈r0〉 − 〈δ〉 if s0 = 1. (2)
Complexity. This protocol requires one multiplication for
each iteration plus one for the last step in (1). Therefore the
complexity depends on the bit length of r and it is equal to `
multiplications, which require 2` transmissions.
B. Biometrics tools
In our work we compare two different authentication
systems: an iris authentication protocol and a multimodal
system relying on the fusion at the score level of iriscode
and eigenfaces. Both protocols are developed in the encrypted
domain by relying on the SPDZ framework. Different and
more accurate protocols exist, but their privacy preserving
implementation have such a high complexity to make them
impractical. In the following subsections, we first describe
the standalone iris (Section III-B1) and face (Section III-B2)
protocols in the plain domain, then the main characteristics of
a general multimodal recognition protocol (Section III-B3).
1) Iris recognition: In our implementation, we use the
iriscode template proposed for the first time by Daugman in
[20] and then modified by Masek in [12]. The description of
the entire extraction process is out of the scope of this paper,
therefore we limit the presentation to the details which are
relevant for the current work.
An iriscode is a bit vector of length N depending on
the radial r and angular θ resolutions used during template
extraction. The extraction process outputs also a bitwise noise
mask. The noise mask represents the regions of the iris altered
by noise, e.g. by eyelashes end eyelid. To compare two
templates (the query and the probe enrolled in the database) the
authentication process relies on a weighted Hamming distance,
where the weights depend on the noise mask bits. In this way
only significant bits are used to calculate the distance between
the two templates. Given the template length N = 2 · r · θ, we
indicate by F1 = f1,1 . . . f1,N and F2 = f2,1 . . . f2,N the iris
templates and M1 = m1,1 . . .m1,N and M2 = m2,1 . . .m2,N
the corresponding noise masks. We assume that the value
mi = 1 in the mask vector indicates that the bit is affected by
noise and must be excluded from the computation. Moreover,
we indicate with a = 1 − a the negation of a feature bit a.
The weighted Hamming Distance (HD) can be calculated as:
HD =
‖(F1 ⊕ F2) ∧ (M1 ∧M2)‖
N − ‖M1 ∨M2‖
=
∑N
j [(f1,j ⊕ f2,j) ∧ (m1,i ∧m2,i)]
N −∑Nj=1m1,j ∨m2,j . (3)
2) Face recognition: Face templates can be generated by
relying on the eigenfaces method proposed by Tuck and
Pentland in [19] providing a set of facial characteristics that
can be used to describe all the faces into the database (the
face-space), as eigenvectors do in linear algebra. The template
associated to a face Γ, is the projection of Γ on the face
space Ω = [ω1 . . . ωk]. Each ωj describes the contribution
of the corresponding eigenface, ej , in representing the input
image. In order to find the image that best matches with Γ,
the algorithm looks for the projection vector Ωj among all
database images, that minimizes the Euclidean distance
ED = ‖Ω− Ωj‖ =
√√√√ k∑
i=0
(Ωi − Ωj,i)2. (4)
3) Multi-biometric score level fusion: In this work we
choose to use multimodal fusion (face and iris) at score level.
This is motivated by the fact that, following the considerations
in Section II-B, face and iris recognition protocols allow to
easily compute the match score in the encrypted domain.
Moreover, we underline that both iris and face can be acquired
at the same time in real applications, for example by using
a smartphone camera. We summarize our fusion system in
Figure 1.
Fig. 1. General scheme of our fusion protocol.
Match scores generated by iris and face classifiers are
characterised by a different range of values: the output of
the iris protocol is a real number in [0, 1], while the output
of the face recognition protocol is a squared number in
[0,M ],M ∈ R. Many ways have been proposed to overcome
the problems generated by the differences between the scores
provided by different biometric recognition systems (see [31]
for more details). Among them, due to the characteristics
of our MPC system, we choose a linear combination of the
scores. Furthermore, to normalize the face matching score, we
choose to use a min - max normalization method [31].
face score norm =
score−minface
maxface −minface
, (5)
where minface,maxface, indicate the minimum and max-
imum values of the face range. Since minface = 0, if
i ∈ [0, 1] is the Hamming distance resulting from iris match,
f the Euclidean distance between faces, and R the maximum
value of the face recognition system, multimodal recognition
corresponds to checking if the following inequality holds:
α · i+ β · f
R
< t (6)
where α, β ∈ [0, 1] are proper weights and t ∈ [0, 1] is the
threshold.
The choice of the parameters α, β, T determines the trade-
off between equal error rate (EER) and computational com-
plexity (Section V-A). As in [34], [32] we choose β = 1− α
for the tests in the plain domain. More details are provided in
Section IV.
IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the details of SEMBA imple-
mentation. We start by presenting the security model (Section
IV-A), then we present the implementation of the iris and
face authentication protocols (Sections IV-B and IV-C) and
the multimodal biometric protocol (Section IV-D). Finally, we
discuss the security of the SPDZ protocols in Section IV-E.
A. Security model
All the protocols involve a client (the biometric owner)
and a server that authenticates the identity of the client. Since
in our computation we have only two parties, from now on,
the SPDZ protocol is described for n = 2. On one hand the
client does not want to reveal his biometric templates, on the
other hand the server does not want to dislocate its records.
Both client and server can be malicious, i.e. they may be
interested in gaining as much information as possible on the
other party even by deviating from the protocol. Considering
that the SPDZ protocol involving n parties is secure up to
n − 1 malicious parties, we assume that only one between
the client and the server can act maliciously. We underline
that if both act maliciously, they obtain no real information
about the counterpart. We also assume that the parties are
connected through a secure channel providing privacy against
eavesdroppers and any third party that can compromise the
transmission.
B. Iris authentication protocol in encrypted domain
The SPDZ protocol supports operations modulo p. Each
binary element of an iris feature is encrypted as a modulo p
integer 〈a〉-share. For this reason, to implement the Hamming
distance computation as in Equation (3), we must implement
logical operations ⊕,∨,∧ as a combination of integer opera-
tions +,−, ·. The correspondence between binary and integer
operations is detailed in Table II.
TABLE II. CORRESPONDENCE TABLE BETWEEN BINARY AND
INTEGER OPERATIONS
Binary Integer
a⊕ b a+ b− 2 · a · b
a ∧ b a · b
a ∨ b a+ b− a · b
a 1− a
Let F1 = f1,1, f1,2, · · · , f1,N and F2 = f2,1, f2,2, · · · , f2,N
be two binary iris feature templates, where N is the number
of features, we indicate with 〈Fi〉 the vector containing shares
of each element, i.e. the vector 〈fi,1〉, 〈fi,2〉, · · · 〈fi,n〉 for i =
1, 2.
Since M1 ∧M2 is equivalent to M1 ∨M2, the Hamming
distance in Equation (3) can be computed as:∑N
i=1 {(f1,i + f2,i − 2 · f1,i · f2,i) · [1− (m1,i ∨m2,i)]}
N −∑Nj=1(m1,i ∨m2,i) , (7)
where m1,i ∨m2,i = m1,i +m2,i −m1,i ·m2,i.
In SPDZ, as well as in other MPC protocols, division is
a very expensive operation. Hence, instead of evaluating the
division and then compare the distance with an acceptance
threshold, the denominator is multiplied by the threshold
before the comparison. By letting
num =
N∑
i=1
{(f1,i + f2,i − 2f1,if2,i) [1− (m1,i ∨m2,i)]} (8)
and
den = N −
N∑
j=1
(m1,i ∨m2,i), (9)
the authentication check corresponds to
num < t · den. (10)
As it can be seen from Equation (8), many share mul-
tiplications are needed to calculate the numerator, namely,
N multiplications for each F1 ⊕ F2, M1 ∧ M2 and (F1 ⊕
F2)∧ (M1 ∧M2). To compute the denominator, we can reuse
the m1,i ∨ m2,i already computed for the numerator. Multi-
plication between shares requires data transmission, slowing
down the computation. To optimize the protocol, we split
the multiplication protocol into two parts. First we calculate
〈εi〉 = 〈f1,i〉− 〈a〉 and 〈δi〉 = 〈f2,i〉− 〈b〉, for all i = 1 . . . N .
Then, to partially open the values, both server and client
exchange shares by using a packet for all ε’s and one for
all δ’s. In this way we need only two transmissions for N
multiplications.
Complexity. Computing F1 ⊕ F2 and M1 ∧M2 requires
N multiplications each, one for each element of the template;
moreover, N multiplications are required to compute (F1 ⊕
F2)∧(M1∧M2). The total cost associated to the computation
of num is 3N multiplications but, as we explained above, we
need only 6 transmissions. Computing den (Equation (9)) has
a negligible complexity since m1,i + m2,i − m1,i · m2,i has
already been calculated for all i in Equation (8). Moreover, we
need a multiplication between den and t, and ` multiplications
for the comparison, where ` is the number of bits necessary
to represent a modulo p integer (see Section III-A1). Conse-
quently, we need 3N + `+ 1 multiplications but only 2`+ 7
transmissions for the iris protocol.
C. Face authentication in encrypted domain
As for the iris, we assume that face features have already
been computed according to the protocol described in Section
III-B2, obtaining a set of k real features Ωi that have been
rounded to represent them in Fp (in the next we avoid the
round operator for simplicity). Given the projection Ω of
the query face image, the face-based biometric authentication
protocol must evaluate the Euclidean distance ED as in
Equation (4), and check if it is lower than a threshold t.
Considering that the square root cannot be evaluated efficiently
in SPDZ, we instead compare the Squared Euclidean distance
(SED) against the squared threshold:
k∑
i=1
(Ωi − Ωj,i)2 < t2. (11)
In equation (11), Ωi indicates an element of the face Ω and
Ωj,i the i-th element of the projection Ωj . Moreover, as we did
for the Hamming distance, we separate the square computation
into two parts, so we need only one transmission to calculate
SED.
Complexity. The computation of the Squared Euclidean
distance requires the evaluation of k squares that can be
parallelised, hence only one transmission is necessary. For the
comparison we need ` products, as in the iris authentication
protocol. Considering that squares and products have similar
complexity, the complexity of the protocol is given by k + `
products.
D. Fusion in encrypted domain
We now describe our solution to implement the fusion
protocol in the encrypted domain. As outlined in Equation
(6), we use a linear combination of the matching scores; to
avoid performing divisions, we evaluate
α · num ·R+ β · SED · den < T · den ·R, (12)
where num and den stand for the numerator and denominator
of the iris Hamming distance, i in (6), while SED, R and T
stand for squared Euclidean distance score, face maximum
range, and threshold.
The SPDZ framework does not allow the use of non-
integer numbers, so α, β and T are scaled and approximated to
integers in the interval [0, 10]. We chose this interval because
it is accurate enough to obtain the same results achieved in
the plain domain, and the resulting bitlength is small enough
to make it possibile to represent α · num ·R+ β · SED · den
and T · den ·R in Zp.
Complexity The previous formula requires three multipli-
cations and six transmissions that cannot be run in parallel.
Moreover, it needs ` multiplications for the comparison. In
total, the linear fusion requires `+6 multiplications and 2`+12
transmissions, plus the multiplications necessary to compute
the Hamming and the squared Euclidean distances. The total
complexity of the full multimodal protocol is 3N + ` + 6
multiplications and k squares, while it requires only 2` + 19
transmissions.
TABLE III. COMPLEXITY SUMMARY. WE UNDERLINE THAT
TRANSMISSION NUMBER DEPENDS ONLY ON p’S BITLENGTH `.
Multiplication Squares Transmissions
Iris 3N + `+ 1 0 2`+ 7
Face ` k 2`+ 1
Multimodal 3N + `+ 6 k 2`+ 19
E. Protocol security
Relying on SPDZ tool, our protocols is secure in the
UC model if at least one of the two parties is honest. In
fact, according to [2], our SPDZ-based protocol is secure
against n− 1 malicious adversaries, where n = 2 in our two-
party computation scenario. The offline phase does not depend
on the functionality evaluated and its security demonstration
against active adversaries in the UC model is provided in [2].
The security demonstration of the online protocol is provided
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The online SPDZ implementation of SEMBA is
computationally secure against any static adversary corrupt-
ing at most 1 party if p is exponential in the security parameter.
Proof: The proof follows the security demonstra-
tion of the online SPDZ protocol in [2]. We rely on the
simulator SONLINE defined in [2] to work on top of the
ideal multibiometric authentication functionality FONLINE, such
that the adversary cannot distinguish among the simulator
using the real function FONLINE and the real SPDZ-based
implementation using multiplication triples generated offline.
Input values broadcasted by both the simulator and honest
players are uniform and it is not possible to distinguish among
them. During execution, interaction with player is performed
only during multiplication and squaring where partial opening
reveals uniform values for both honest parties and simulator.
Also MACs have similar distribution in both the protocol and
the simulation. If the protocol does not abort due to a cheat
detection, both the real and the simulated runs output the
decision bit. In the simulation the decision bit is obtained by a
correct evaluation of the multi-biometric function on the inputs
provided by the player. In real SPDZ-based implementation the
adversary can cheat in the MAC check with probability 2/p.
Hence the probability that the adversary can distinguished the
simulated environment from the real one is negligible if p is
exponential. The adversary is not able to obtain the inputs of
the honest player because if the protocol does not abort, he
can observe only its input, the input shares received by the
other party and the final result. To obtain the original inputs
of the honest party, the adversary should be able to solve the
inequality in (6), which has Ni+Nf unknown variables for the
server and Ni+Nf+3 for the client, where Ni and Nf are the
number of features used to represent iris and face respectively.
V. SYSTEM TUNING
In this section, we present the results of the tests performed
on plain data. We will use such results to choose the best pa-
rameters to build an efficient protocol working in the encrypted
domain. Tests have been carried out on the “CASIA-IrisV1”
database for irises and “CASIA-FaceV5 part 1” database for
faces, both collected by the Chinese Academy of Sciences’
Institute of Automation (CASIA) [35], [36].
The CASIA-IrisV1 database for irises [35] contains 756
grey-scale eye images with 108 unique irises (or classes) and
7 images for each of them. As in [12], we used a subset of
the database for the tests, retaining only those images in wich
the algorithm has well separated iris region from sclera and
pupil. The resulting database contains 625 eye images.
The CASIA-FaceV5 Databases for faces part 1 [36] con-
tains 500 face images of 100 subjects. The face images are
captured using Logitech USB camera in one session. All face
images are 16 bit color BMP files and the image resolution is
640× 480 pixels.
We implemented and tested our SPDZ-based iris and
multibiometric protocols on a desktop equipped with 8GB
RAM processor Intel Core i3 CPU 550 @ 3.20 GHz Quad-
Core running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS (64 bit) operative system. We
developed the test using C++ language with GMP free library
for arbitrary precision arithmetic, operating on signed integers,
rational numbers, and floating-point numbers.
To implement the SPDZ protocol we chose the 46 bit
prime number p = 67280421310721, which is big enough
to allow all the needed modular operations and comparisons,
and guarantee the security of the protocol. Server and client
run on the same computer, and we used a socket to simulate
the transmission channel.
A. Parameter optimisation
We performed tests on plain data, running the authenti-
cation protocol on each single biometric and then by fusing
eigenfaces and iriscodes.
a) Iris: For testing the iris authentication protocol, we
have chosen a radial resolution r ranging from 4 to 20 and an
angular resolution θ between 100 and 200 (Table IV). As said
above, we tested the protocol on 625 eye images and each
one has been compared with all the others. To perform the
tests in the plain domain, we used the Matlab code provided
by L. Masek (iris recognition source code [37]) as part of his
work [12]. As we can see from Table IV, the best accuracy
is achieved by letting the angular resolution be equal to 160
angles and radial resolution equal to 20 corresponding to an
iris feature vector of length 6400.
To reduce the EER, Masek ([12]) shifts n times the iris
templates keeping the lowest Hamming distance score. In
SPDZ this operation is computationally very expensive, so
we could not afford it.
TABLE IV. IRISCODE EER (%) WITHOUT SHIFTING, AS A FUNCTION
OF DIFFERENT VALUES OF r AND θ.
r
Angular Resolution θ
100 120 140 160 180 200
4 8.19 6.43 4.37 3.34 3.31 3.10
6 6.88 5.05 3.01 2.45 2.71 3.01
8 6.13 4.42 2.69 2.19 2.58 4.36
10 6.31 4.03 2.64 2.44 2.54 3.92
12 5.96 4.10 2.56 2.14 2.59 3.71
14 5.71 3.85 2.54 2.17 2.58 3.27
16 5.49 3.79 2.32 2.13 2.51 3.31
18 5.71 3.61 2.46 2.31 2.41 3.18
20 5.77 3.74 2.20 2.08 2.41 3.13
b) Face: We have implemented the eigenface protocol
by using the Open Source Computer Video (openCV) library1
and Matlab. Face images are 640 × 480 pixel and we trans-
formed them in 256 grey level images. The protocol has been
tested on 500 images. We used the algorithm provided in the
openCV library to build k eigenfaces with k = 1 . . . 10. Each
image is thus represented by a projection vector of length k.
Each projection element is a 16-bit integer and the squared
Euclidean distance has been calculated by using Matlab. We
observed that the use of more than 5 projections does not
provide any significant improvement (see Table V).
1http://opencv.org/about.html
TABLE V. EIGENFACE EER (%) VALUES, AS A FUNCTION OF THE
NUMBER OF PROJECTIONS.
k EER (%) k EER (%)
1 28.77 6 17.01
2 17.37 7 16.19
3 16.62 8 16.51
4 16.59 9 16.38
5 16.08 10 16.09
c) Multimodal: We have evaluated the efficiency of the
fusion protocol in the plain domain, by fusing the outcomes of
face and iris sub-algorithms through a Matlab implementation.
From Table IV, we have chosen some relevant iris configura-
tions, based on the achieved EER or number of features. First
of all, to better compare with the best iris result, we chose
r = 20 and θ = 160 resulting in N = 6400, then for each
θ, we looked for the best accuracy under 4%, and finally we
chose those configurations with EER similar to the previous
ones but less features. Moreover, we varied α in the interval
[0, 1] and the number of eigenfaces k from 1 to 10. Table VI
summarizes our results, showing the EER for each N and k.
As shown in Table VI, the same accuracy of the 6400
stand alone iris protocol (2.08%) can be reached with many
different multi-biometric configurations, e.g. by using N =
3600 and k = 7 or even by using only 1600 iris features and
k = 1. For the tests in the encrypted domain, between the two
configurations with the same accuracy, we chose the last one,
since it has lower bandwidth and computational complexity
(see Table III and Table VIII). We can also notice that keeping
N = 1600, but using 2 features for face representation, we
can lower both accuracy and complexity. Generally, by using
two eigenfaces, the best possibile accuracy is provided with
5760 iris features, however the same performance are obtained
also by the combination of 3600 iris features and three face
features. For this reasons, we tested several configurations in
the encrypted domain, as summarised in Table VII.
VI. COMPLEXITY OF THE SPDZ PROTOCOL
We evaluated the computational complexity of our im-
plementation of the SPDZ protocol (Section IV), by using
the parameters chosen in the previous section (see Table IV
and Table VII). Execution times are heavily affected by the
number of multiplications. As we said in Section IV-B, when
possible, we performed a single transmission, by packing data.
To calculate the execution time, reported in Table IX, we used
the clock function, measuring the CPU time of the process.
In SEMBA the number of transmission rounds depends
only on the bitlength ` of the prime number p and not on
the feature configuration, as it can be seen from Table III.
On the contrary, the amount of data transmitted by each party
also depends on the number of features used in the protocol.
In fact, the iris authentication protocol has a bandwidth of
(6N + 2` + 2) · ` bits, while the multimodal protocol band-
width is ` · (6N + k + 2` + 12) bits. Since the complexity
of the iris protocol is much higher than that of the face-
based authentication protocol, the overhead introduced by the
multimodal biometric authentication is of few bytes, as it can
be seen from Table VIII. For this reason, the communication
complexity remains almost constant switching from the iris to
the multimodal protocol.
TABLE VI. EER OF THE MULTIMODAL BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL. THE FIRST THREE COLUMNS SHOW IRIS’S PARAMETERS: FEATURE’S
NUMBER (N), RADIAL RESOLUTION (r), AND ANGULAR RESOLUTION θ. FOURTH COLUMN REPRESENTS IRIS AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM’S EER (%). ALL
THE OTHERS COLUMNS CONTAIN THE EER’S OBTAINED BY FUSING AN IRIS TEMPLATE OF LENGTH N AND A FACE TEMPLATE WITH k ∈ {1 . . . 10}
EIGENFACES. WE HIGHLIGHTED IN BOLD THE CONFIGURATIONS THAT WE HAVE SELECTED FOR THE TESTS UNDER ENCRYPTION.
Iris Parameters Number of Eigenfaces (k)
N r θ iris 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
6400 20 160 2.08 1.17 1.15 1.02 1.25 1.25 1.24 1.31 1.37 1.4 1.41
5760 16 180 2.51 1.26 0.98 1.01 1.22 1.38 1.36 1.43 1.47 1.49 1.50
5600 20 140 2.20 1.20 1.08 1.19 1.18 1.34 1.28 1.36 1.38 1.39 1.40
4800 20 120 3.74 1.90 1.97 1.65 1.98 2.04 2.15 2.11 2.17 2.2 2.21
3840 12 160 2.14 1.84 1.52 1.50 1.45 1.63 1.74 1.76 1.77 1.78 1.78
3600 10 180 2.54 1.36 1.23 0.97 1.65 1.82 1.99 2.07 2.15 2.17 2.19
3360 12 140 2.56 1.51 1.32 1.38 1.31 1.56 1.61 1.58 1.63 1.67 1.69
2560 8 160 2.19 1.50 1.24 1.19 1.15 1.39 1.49 1.59 1.6 1.61 1.62
2400 6 200 3.01 2.01 1.83 1.89 2.13 2.37 2.56 2.66 2.7 2.72 2.73
2160 6 180 2.71 1.92 1.74 1.82 1.98 2.04 2.09 2.07 2.13 2.16 2.18
1920 6 160 2.45 1.47 1.42 1.43 1.57 1.66 1.95 1.92 1.95 1.96 1.97
1600 4 200 3.10 2.01 1.87 1.85 2.41 2.37 2.56 2.67 2.69 2.71 2.71
1280 4 160 3.34 2.29 1.89 2.22 2.26 2.51 2.80 2.80 2.92 2.98 3.01
TABLE VII. EQUAL ERROR RATE OF IRIS AND MULTIMODAL
BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS FOR DIFFERENT SETTINGS; α, t
RESPECTIVELY STAND FOR FUSION COEFFICIENT AND THRESHOLD.
Iris EER Face Fusion parameters
N Iris (%) Fusion (%) k α t
1600 3.10 2.01 1 0.80 0.35
1600 3.10 1.87 2 0.55 0.25
3600 2.54 0.97 3 0.55 0.25
5760 2.51 0.98 2 0.80 0.35
6400 2.08 1.15 2 0.80 0.35
TABLE VIII. COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY FOR THE IRIS AND
MULTIMODAL PROTOCOLS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTICE THAT ADDING
FEW EIGENFACES INCERASES THE BANDWIDTH BY A FEW BYTES ONLY.
Iris bandwidth (KB) Face
N iris multimodal overhead k
1600 53.24 53.30 0.06 1
3600 119.16 119.23 0.07 3
5760 190.35 190.42 0.07 2
6400 211.44 211.51 0.07 2
The main goal of our work was exploiting multimodality
to reduce complexity while maintaining the same accuracy of
the iris-based protocol. Moreover, our analysis shows that the
multimodal protocol can also be used to lower the EER without
a significant loss in terms of complexity. In the following, we
discuss both cases.
a) Improved efficiency: The running time of the stand
alone iris authentication protocol ranges from 0.03s for 1600
bits, up to 0.12s for a 6400 bit-long template in the malicious
setting (see Table IX), while Luo et al. protocol [16] with
masks needs 2.5s for 9600 bits and 0.56s for 2048 bits in the
semi-honest setting. Moreover from Table VII and Table IX,
it is evident that SEMBA can provide the same accuracy of
the best stand alone iris protocol, but with lower execution
time and computational complexity. As a matter of fact, the
best EER for the standalone iris protocol is 2.08% for 6400
features corresponding to 19246 multiplications (Table III) in
0.12s, while in the fusion configuration for 1600 iris features
and 1 eigenface feature, we need only 8744 multiplications
(see Table III, where we consider squares as multiplications)
to obtain an EER equal to 2.01% in about 0.03 seconds. On
the contrary, the number of required transmissions increases
from 2`+ 7 to 2`+ 19 (Table III), but it depends only on the
bit length of p.
b) Improved accuracy: As an alternative to improve the
computational complexity, the use of two biometries instead of
one can be exploited to achieve a higher accuracy, at the cost
of a slight increase of complexity with respect to the iriscode
protocol. In fact, as shown in Table III, complexity depends
heavily on the number of iris features, however by adding two
eigenfaces it is possible to decrease the EER rate, while the
number of multiplications increases only from 3N + `+ 1 to
3N + `+ 6 + k = 3N + `+ 8 (as usual we consider squaring
to be equivalent to multiplication). More generally, when we
move to multimodal authentication, the total CPU time slightly
increases with respect to the unimodal iris protocol, but the
EER always decreases; by adding one more eigenface (k = 2)
to the 1600 iris feature configuration considered above, we
can have a better EER (1.87%) with the same time complexity
(0.03 seconds). For the case of 5760 bit long iris template, the
EER passes from from 2.1% for the unimodal authentication
to 0.98% for the bimodal case with k = 2 (Table VII). Finally,
keeping 0.98% as target accuracy, we highlight that we can
reduce N to 3600 at the cost of an additional feature in the face
representation (k = 3). In this case, computational complexity
goes from 36926 to 19596 multiplications and time complexity
decreases from 0.109s to 0.05s (Table VIII and Table IX).
TABLE IX. IRIS PROTOCOL TIME IN SPDZ SYSTEM.
Iris CPU time Face
N Iris (s) multimodal (s) k
1600
0.029s
0.030 1
1600 0.030 2
3600 0.048 0.049 3
5760 0.11s 0.109 2
6400 0.12s 0.120 2
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed SEMBA, a multimodal
authentication system based on the MPC approach SPDZ
[2], [1] secure against a malicious party. We have shown
that by using a multi-modal system it is possible to improve
the efficiency of the recognition process in terms of number
of multiplications and evaluation time, without any loss of
accuracy. In the same way, it is also possible to improve
accuracy at the cost of a negligible increase of complexity.
As an additional contribution, we adapted the iris and face au-
thentication protocols to work in the SPDZ setting. A further
additional complexity reduction is achieved by resorting to
packed transmission of encrypted data involved in the secure
multiplication protocol. As future work, we plan to extend
our approach to even more biometric traits, like fingerprints,
behavioral biometric and many others. Another interesting
research direction could be to look for different algorithms and
more efficient fusion rules to merge the match scores. We are
also interested to test our protocol on mobile devices, in order
to measure the complexity of the whole protocol, including
also multi-biometric acquisition and feature extraction.
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